Towards the Year 2000:
World Political Scenarios

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1. Of Political Scientists and Futuristic Politics

The largest group of professional students of the future may well be political scientists.[1] Yet, there appears to be only a trickle of futurist material on world, regional or national politics. The academic and popular material on world politics, for instance, manifests a dominant concern for the present and the past. There is some material on the immediate, say five-year, future, but rarely does one encounter sustained interest in the possible political life of this planet within the next generation.

Several reasons may be offered to explain the paucity of futurist political material. In many areas of the world, political imaging may be high-risk activity. In some authoritarian societies, for instance, politics becomes an academic *bête noir,* perhaps largely the concern of apologists or domesticated analysts. Histories of political life, particularly those which serve or at least do not violate the interests of a ruling regime become standard political outputs. Political biographies and other exhortative material become convenient areas of scholarship. The projection of present trends in politics, if only because this demands a clear exposition, a critical examination of current policies, may be an imprudent concern for many scholars.

Even in a milieu which does not stifle political imaging, however, the scholar may still be wary about political futuristics. The very complexity and apparent low reliability of political data appropriate for futurist studies vitiate the interest in political forecasting. Specially in the last decade (1965-1975), political developments most difficult to anticipate have occurred. (Examples of such developments are détente as the political imperative of Sino-American and Russo-American relations,[2] the dramatically successful use of oil by the Middle East for political purposes, and the extremely rapid dis-

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placement of American power in the Indo-Chinese area.) At the very least, such developments encourage cautiousness, an attitude of let's-wait-and-see among scholars who might have been prone to jump at every forecasting opportunity.

Related to the scholar's discomfort with political data on account of its complexity and low reliability is another possible reason for the apparent lack of interest in political futures. It may well be that other areas (e.g., economics, demography) have been perceived as more manageable areas for futurist studies. Apart from having more reliable and more readily available data, these areas have developed methodologies which permit more precise formulations of either trend-extrapolated or prognostically-valued alternative futures. Political scientists thus are tempted to collaborate in essentially nonpolitical future forecasting and imaging.

Finally, paradoxical though it may initially appear, there is the possibility of political scientists being intimidated by the very successful, very panoramic works of some colleagues. When a powerful analyst (who incidentally, is by profession a nonpolitical scientist) like Herman Kahn appears to exhaust the limits of political imagination, there are probably at least a few political scientists who will be turned off from futuristic politics. (This writer, for instance, confronted by Kahn and Wiener's *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years,*[3] found the framework to be so impressively comprehensive. It was very tempting to ignore the authors' admonition about a framework and to treat it instead as the framework for any futurist politics. Though this writer finally managed to resist the temptation, he nevertheless felt that it will be sometime before political scientists are able to provide alternative frameworks for discussing the future with as totalistic a scope as Kahn and Wiener's.)

The reasons cited to explain the wariness with which political scientists appear to approach the political future hopefully will be less and less important with the passage of time. Political regimes may be more sensitive to the need for long-range political imaging as these regimes become more stable and thus more secure over time. Political scientists may gain greater confidence in their ability to generate and work with political data necessary for futuristic investigations; they certainly are going to profit from their current associations with colleagues in the more methodologically formalized disciplines. And as they gain confidence in their own abilities it can be expected that the future will become, as it was before, a major concern for political philosophers and political scientists.

2. World Politics: Two Basic Systematic Properties

This paper delineates some of the more likely developments in world politics for the next twenty-five years. It also seeks to project the inter-relatedness of these developments. The day has long passed when political developments in one part of the world could be localized or their global implications long delayed so as not significantly to affect the present generation. It is the nature of current and forthcoming politics that there be both *totality* as well as *acceleration* of effects of any given political development. The displacement of a political regime generally will continue to have international implications not only for that country and its immediate area but for the world as a whole. And as we move beyond 1975 towards the year 2000, political men will be more and more impressed by the rapidity with which political developments will affect world politics. (The fall of South Vietnam and the rapid train of events which spelled political accommodation and power redistribution in South Asia are only a preview of the accelerated processes of world politics.)

3. The Main Concerns of World Politics

In a very interesting sense, the primary concerns of world politics will remain the same for the next twenty-five years as they have been for the last two thousand years. In politics, the "future of the future", to borrow McHale's insightful phrase,[4] at least for the next generation, is indeed the future which the past and the present imaged in concert. The priority concern continues to be the establishment of world peace, or in a more negative sense, the disestablishment of war.

This major concern will be reflected in the other political concerns, namely, the regulation of armaments, the initiation and operation of functionalist organizations where nations actively cooperate in well-specified areas of common interest,[5] the more responsible diplomacy of the superpowers gradually less subject to chauvinistic formulations, and the greater participation of smaller states, through regional structures, in the world political theatre, i.e., democratization of world politics.

At the state level, the concern for peace will often translate into an unmitigated quest for efficient government. Public administration will become less subject to ideological influences which, too often in the past, were artificial implantations into a local political culture, ignored largely by colonial administrators and, after independence,

by colonial-minded native leaders.

The statement of that which has been the perennial concern of political philosophers and statesmen — peace — as the imperative of politics in the next twenty-five years should not deceive one into concluding that the parameters of world politics have not changed radically. Perhaps even ahead of the now popularly perceived radical dimensions of global crises in natural, demographic and technological resources,[6] the crisis of world politics ushered mankind into a new age which demands a radical reorientation of human attitudes and social values.[7] With the twin atomic explosions in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, world politics as primarily a process dominated by national interests began to "wither away." A brief thirty-year period, still dominantly characterized by narrow nationalistic politics, has increasingly shown how thermonuclear politics, even as it vests nation-states with awesome power, robs them of much discretion in the use of that power. A balance of terror has become the defining element of the historic balance-of-power scenarios of world politics. Neither in Korea nor Vietnam was thermonuclear capability seriously considered except by a few desperate and irresponsible individuals. Thermonuclear war, the unthinkable, thought out, proved to be a successful deterrent even for men who traditionally tended to employ the most devastating items of their military arsenal.

There is yet another concern of world politics which may be as pressing as the generation of peace, the development of a political theory which transcends the limits of liberalism and of its ultimate compromise, the welfare state. Between now and the year 2000 (and perhaps for some time beyond), mankind will have to develop a political philosophy which incorporates the following realities: 1) the technological character of modern societies which increasingly impinges on traditionally established areas of public and private competence, often blurring the distinction between what is public and what is private; 2) the partly, technologically indicated shift from the liberal concept of political representation (one man, one vote) towards representation along lines of "technological functional specialization"[8]; 3) the greater proliferation of intra- and supra-governmental functional organizations, what Peter Drucker identifies as a "pluralist society of organizations: an organic diversity in which institutions are used to do what they are best equipped to do";[9] 4) the increasing commitment to view the world as "spaceship earth" and its limited resources as the natural resources of mankind, to be wisely and efficiently utilized not in the profligate interest of any single society but of mankind in general; this is a view which has

been alternatively termed "organic growth" by the Club of Rome[10] and "ecological humanism" by Victor Ferkiss;[11] and 5) the greater claims for social justice pressed in both national and international societies.

There are probably other concerns of politics which will occupy mankind in the next twenty-five years. The attempt to establish world peace and to develop a political theory beyond liberalism, however, will be the major issues of our period. The first concern seeks to ensure the continuity of human life; the second, to make that life worth living.

4. World Political Scenarios

World politics is an extremely complex reality. In order to talk about it we are forced to simplify it. One of our simplifying aids is the *scenario.* Scenarios are "hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points.[12] The world political scenarios offered here are the result of immersion in voluminous data characteristic of politics. A major concern of the political analyst is to generate a coherent framework within which one's speculation about future political developments may be appreciated as systematically related to each other. The world after all is an integrated reality and, as has been pointed out earlier, has increasingly presented itself as such.

Two main types of scenarios are dealt with here: the *standard* and the *alternative* scenarios. *Standard scenarios* are images of political phenomena strongly indicated by historical data and trend analysis from such data. *Alternative scenarios* are images of political phenomena which result from a deliberate modification of developments indicated by trend analysis or, at times, the deliberate assumption of discontinuity from a historical trend. When alternative scenarios are explicitly generated by value preferences, the analyst often engages himself in a type of futuristics known as *prognostics.*

4.1 *Assumptions*

Every attempt at scenario-building invariably involves a set of assumptions either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by the analyst. Three assumptions are made in this paper.

The first assumption is: there will be no nuclear war in the next twenty-five years. It is an assumption dictated by sanity and the primitive will to survive. It is also generated by the perception that we have not yet evolved any structure which guarantees the

containment of a "local" nuclear conflict. Until such a structure has been created, all nuclear conflicts must be viewed as probably general nuclear incidents, rapidly drawing every nuclear power and the world into the vortex of mutual destruction.

The second assumption relates to the technology of war. Unless revolutionary defensive technology provides the military with dramatic ways of neutralizing nuclear weapons, the operational offensive technology of war will be basically nuclear in the next twenty-five years.

Biological and chemical (BC) agents of war, of course, have had a long history of research and development. In the case of chemical agents, actual use may be asserted for the two World Wars. Most recently, in Vietnam, biological agents appear not to have been used, or detected in use, in warfare yet. There have been tests, some resulting in various dangerous incidents of research experiments with biological agents. There has also been stockpiling of BC agents.

Though there have been calculations of DOE (Death on Earth) figures in the context of BC agents, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons remains the more impressive one. The DOE figures for BC agents appear to be largely academic exercises, assuming factors of control (e.g., uniform dispersal of BC agents, uniform lethal dosages, ideal meteorological conditions, etc.) which may remain largely unpredictable in the next twenty-five years.[13]

It is true that even now there appears to be research in the major powers towards developing a new generation of weapons. There are reports of research into environment modification, weather control and manipulation, and even earth-quake-inducement. International concern has reached a point where both American and Soviet policymakers strongly urge a treaty banning military use of man-made or man-induced changes of nature.[14]

These potential weapons of war, however, will take time researching into, developing, testing and, finally, producing. It will probably be close to the end of the century before they can be viewed as having operational status. However, more than the factor of time which largely rules out these weapons systems for the next twenty-five years, the consideration of whether they significantly add to man's capacity for destruction must be looked into. The history of armaments, from ancient *ballista* to modern ICBMs, MIRVs and MARVs, has shown an almost exponential trajectory of man's capacity to kill his fellowmen. Mankind has lately attained a point where the self-destruction of the species becomes a terrifying technical possibility. Beyond nuclear arms which make possible the

nightmare of man's demise, it does not make sense to consider whatever destructive capacities other weapons systems might have. It simply is not academically interesting nor physically possible to kill mankind twice over or four times over.[15]

A final assumption is made in this paper. Although in the long run man's survival appears to depend upon his capacity to modify his historical "nature," the technology of behavioral control, in the next twenty-five years, will not be dispersed enough nor will the political and ethical decision be sufficiently strong to universalize behavioral control. The technology may already be with us, but the social and psychological adjustments necessary to permit the efficient operation of this technology promise to delay popular behavior control at least for another twenty-five years.[16]

The phenomenon of secondary development is of critical importance. It implies some extra time before societies get fully committed to technologies; it is during this time when people might develop alternative technologies or make social inventions which significantly modify or even reject morally suspect technologies. It brings relief, however limited and temporary, to know that even while the control technologies of Orwell's *1984* and Huxley's *Brave New World* are with us now, we still have some time in which to attempt a humanization of these technologies.

4.2 *Standard Scenario: Balance-of-Power*

4.2.1 *Historical Background*

The postwar history of world politics lends itself to a balance-of-power interpretation. Except for a rather brief period when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, world politics may be generally perceived as the politics of two superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., as they try to expand their global influence over the various countries of the world.

The postwar balance of power retained some of the classical properties of a prenuclear balance. First, as was the classical case, alliances between a superpower and its client-states formally resulted in bilateral and regional military pacts designed to contain the political capabilities of the opposing power-cluster.[17] Second, a perception of politics as a zero-sum situation continued to prevail. In its simplest formulation, the American policy of containment sought to deny the Soviets political influence in any area of the world. Compounded by a following domino theory of international politics, the American policy-

makers failed to make necessary distinctions between areas vital to American security and those which were not. Thus, American commitment to resist communist influence everywhere led to active American participation in South Korea from 1950 to 1953 and seminal intervention in Indo-China in 1954.

The similarities between the classical and the immediate postwar balances-of-power, however, are clearly offset by their differences. The most obvious difference lay in the extremely limited number of significant political actors. There was such a huge gap between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, on one hand, and the other lesser powers, on the other, when it came to political, military and economic capabilities. For practical purposes, the term "superpower" properly acknowledged this disparity.

Geographically, the focal point of the balance ceased to be situated in the traditional European powers. For the first time in modern history, the balance was dominantly of Soviet-American and not European definition.

Thirdly, the alliances of the postwar balance-of-power were not so subject to shifting loyalties, as before, of the member parties. (Even much later, in the 1960's, when tension within the alliances resulted in French and Chinese challenges to superpower leadership, the alliances remained essentially intact.)

Fourthly, the postwar balance-of-power was global in its scope and not, as traditionally existed, solely European in coverage. Apart from the non-European character of the superpowers and their global capabilities, the universalization of the balance-of-power might have been strongly influenced by the largely ideological definition of international politics after World War II.

Fifthly, and perhaps most significantly, the balance-of-power became increasingly defined in terms of mutual nuclear capabilities, a "balance-of-terror," as Max Lerner in his *Age of Overkill*[18] would put it in referring to postwar international politics. For the first time in man's history, his politics has become capable of translation into the destruction of the human species.

A sixth deviation from the classical balance-of-power politics was the United Nations. Although presaged by the earlier League of Nations, the United Nations formally set up by the Allies in 1945 was destined to become a much more popular political forum. Membership became a badge of statehood and was avidly sought by practically every political society. Although part of its

organizational structure paid lip-service to the myth of political equality among states, its actual sovereign body, the Security Council, clearly indicated big power definition of international politics. The U.N. Security Council, more than any of its institutions, charted the twists and turns of postwar international politics. American dominance in the United Nations and American definitive influence over political issues may be studied simply by checking on the number of vetoes the United States has exercised in the Security Council. (The same thing can be said of Soviet political influence; it too may be sufficiently indicated by the number of Soviet vetoes over specific issues at given times.)

4.2.2 *Recent Modifications of the Postwar Balance of Power*

World politics in the last decade (1965-75) still allowed major roles for the superpowers. Unlike the period from 1945 to 1965, however, superpower hegemony in world politics has been significantly eroded.

The challenge to superpower politics interestingly has been expressed primarily intra-bloc, not inter-bloc as might have been anticipated. The political blocs themselves have become less unified in the last decade.

In the case of the United States, the major challenge was initially hurled by France over the issue of nuclear sharing. Slighted by the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom which permitted nuclear sharing between the two countries and excluded France from the same, the Gaullist leadership questioned the efficacy of the American guarantee to defend NATO countries, in particular France. Despite the great cost involved and the controversial effectiveness of national nuclear deterrence as a military strategy, the French ignored American protests and developed a national nuclear force based partly on an advanced aircraft delivery system (the Mirage IV).[19] The French challenge to American leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even led the French leaders to pull out their military forces from NATO command.

In Latin-America, the challenge to American determination of regional politics was dramatically publicized by the rise of the socialist regimes in Cuba and in Chile and the activation of socialist organizations which often employed violence in their quest for political image-projection.

In Southeast Asia, the traditional influence of the United States over the politics of noncommunist countries became suspect as the Vietnam war increasingly pointed to American inability to win a protracted war against the guerillas supported by Chinese and Soviet military and economic aid. When the Americans finally disengaged themselves from Vietnam, the fall of the Thieu regime, followed by communist successes in Cambodia and Laos, witnessed a train of erstwhile American allies (Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) pragmatically seeking political accommodation with the major communist power in Asia. Immediate talks concerning the formal dissolution of the moribund Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization, a product of the containment policy of the 1950's, followed. Bilateral military pacts with the United States and American military bases in the area were immediate foci of political reevaluation. Southeast Asian countries sought to strengthen instead a nonideologically committed regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by vesting it with powers to discuss and decide economic and other allied concerns.

In the case of the Soviet leadership, nationalistic communism sought to minimize Soviet influence in the internal affairs of states like Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czeckoslovakia. The most dramatic challenge, however, clearly comes from China. The Sino-Soviet split has roots that are ideological and nationalistic. The Chinese denounce the betrayal of socialism by a Soviet leadership increasingly viewed as having become bourgeois and revisionist in its inclusion of patently profit-motivated production schemes. Perhaps with increasing urgency, Chinese attacks on the Soviet leadership may emphasize a state of condition the Chinese never acknowledged to be legitimate even at the best of Sino-Soviet relations. Territorial gains during Czarist times have been consolidated by the Soviet regime and the Chinese have pressed for the return of these territories that were formerly theirs.

The Chinese and Soviet regimes have both attempted to court third-world leadership. Chinese diplomacy has been active in Africa and Asia. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been trying to surround China with pro-Soviet communist and non-aligned countries. In the meantime, border clashes between the military of the two countries have been reported and reputable sources identify a state of military preparedness on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border.

The various challenges to superpower hegemony indicate yet another modification of recent world politics: the depreciation of ideology. Although, formally, communist and noncommunist leaders continue to express their confidence that their respective social systems will prove superior to the other, the current policy definition has gone beyond *peaceful coexistence* (as in the time of Khruschev) and is currently one of *détente.* Détente simply means a joint decision to discover areas of mutual concern in politics, among other areas of life, and to work cooperatively in these areas. (*Entente,* on the other hand, would presume active collaboration over a wider range of concerns, possibly but not necessarily, including ideological systems. Détente is at most political compromise, entente at least political consensus.)

Another modification of recent balance-of-power politics is the increasing commitment on the part of major countries to develop its military nuclear capability. Many states now look upon its ability to explode a nuclear device as entitling it to greater influence in world politics. The fear of nuclear dispersion (the so-called N + 1 country problem) starts perversely only after one has developed its own nuclear capability. In addition to the U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K., France, China and India have opted to join the nuclear club. Japan is an interesting exception so far. Although there are pressures for her to develop a nuclear capability (which may make her third after the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. only in the sophistication of both nuclear warheads and delivery system), Japan continues to voluntarily refrain from joining the nuclear powers. The list of countries with potentials of going nuclear is a fairly long one. Potential nuclear countries include Israel, Brazil, Canada, West Germany, Sweden, Indonesia and Pakistan, among others.

Finally, there are indications that the recent balance-of-power politics may be increasingly influenced by regional associations. The united states of Europe still remain the political commitment of many European Economic Community leaders. The regional organizations of Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia may become more politicized. Although not purely a regional organization, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) made a very political point in favor of collective action by small states. Again, though the various regional organizations may not have as vital a bargaining point as OPEC oil, the lesson of collective action even against a superpower will probably not be lost on Third World countries.

4.2.3 *Standard Scenario: Balance-of-Power*

The previous section has discussed the major features of balance-of-power politics in the postwar world. We have identified the classical, nineteenth century features of this political model and its distinctly postwar, nonclassical properties. Finally, we have identified the major modifications even of the postwar balance-of-power as it exists in the 1970's. What remains now is an attempt to delineate the probable operation of that political model between 1975 and the year 2000. This is a formidable task. The writer cannot help recalling the attitude of Ithiel de Sola Pool, an American political scientist who in 1965 prepared for the American Academy's Commission on the year 2000 a paper on international politics:

The predictions are not stated in arrogant confidence, for the results are certain to prove wrong. The only thing of which one can be confident is that reality will depart radically from these predictions. [20]

Indeed it was wise for de Sola Pool to make this caveat regarding the predictions. For the years 1965 to 1970, less than 10 per cent of his predictions escaped being completely wrong. The present writer, therefore, can be no less cautious. Way before the year 2000, most if not all of his speculations may just as easily prove wrong.

4.2.3.1 *Scenario for 1975-1985*

(*a*) World politics will continue to be largely balance-of-power politics. The major political actors will be the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and Japan.

A policy of détente will continue to characterize Soviet-American and Sino-American politics. There will be a need to maintain détente policies because both the Soviet Union and China will fear American power actively supporting the other side. Sino-Soviet relations will continue to be hostile in view of sustained ideological and territorial differences.

American policy in relation to the Soviet and the Chinese will remain one of détente because of a more liberal attitude with regard to communism and a perception that neither Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe nor possible Chinese supremacy in the Asian mainland constitutes a vital threat to American security. American policy will call for a China strong enough to warrant Soviet military attention, but hopefully not powerful

enough to dominate mainland Asia. Thus, American policy will probably help establish India as an added check to Chinese hegemony in Asia. Also, Japan will be encouraged by both the United States and the Soviet Union to develop a military capability which will help keep China from island southeast Asia.

Japan will maintain a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and China and a policy of close cooperation, even entente, with the United States. Détente with the Soviet Union is indicated by Japanese interests in the reversion of Japanese territories still held by the Soviets. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, looks forward to economic and technical cooperation with Japan specifically in the overall development of Siberia and particularly its Tyumen oil field projects.[21]

Like the United States, the Soviet Union also will probably view détente with Japan as an attempt to check China's political and military superiority in mainland Asia.

Japanese-Sino détente will be indicated both by economic and political factors. Japan looks expectantly upon the Chinese market. (Its sale of steel, machinery and equipment in 1973 to China accounted for a major part of a trade exchange worth $2 billion already.)[22] China, on the other hand, confronted by the spectre of Soviet power, will seek to develop friendly relations with Japan if only because it needs to focus its military and political resources upon the U.S.S.R.

Japanese-American entente will be maintained because the United States is the only country with a Pacific naval capability to ensure Japanese access to raw material sources, most of which are in the Pacific insular areas. Furthermore, unless Japan develops her own nuclear capability, the United States will remain the only effective guarantor of a nuclear umbrella over Japan.

(*b*) As the Soviet Union pursues a policy of détente with the United States, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe will continue to diminish. The need for NATO will be increasingly depreciated and Western Europe will pursue policies of greater independence from the United States.

The United Kingdom, France and West Germany will pursue nationalistic policies which will probably modify the idea of European political unity. Instead of a fully sovereign central authority, there will be plans for central authority where leading members will be given veto powers.[23]

(*c*) Latin America will continue to be mainly within the

American sphere of influence. American political threshold for socialistic regimes will increase and Cuba will normalize relations with the United States.

(*d*) Eastern Europe will remain a Soviet sphere of influence. A certain amount of liberalism will be permitted by the Soviets and there may be less bridled expression of nationalistic communism. Yugoslavia may indicate the ultimate of Soviet political threshold in the area.

(*e*) There will be uneasy peace in the Middle East, secured largely by American supervision through electronic monitoring of military developments in the area. Israel appears likely to develop a nuclear explosive before 1980. A nuclear Israel will probably generate tension among the Arab states and lead the latter towards a pooled nuclear capability. The Arab states will not develop this capability until after 1980.

(*f*) In Southeast Asia, there will be continuing political accommodation with China. Traditionally Western-oriented countries like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines will de-emphasize strong political and military ties with the West. Regional security for these countries will be sought through proposals for neutralizing the area. Since regional security will cover countries of various ideological commitments, it is hard to see how collective security can be evolved here by the efforts alone of the Southeast Asian countries.

Countries with land borders shared with China will seek good relations with China; however, because of Chinese imperial history over the past one thousand years, the same countries will probably continue to maintain connections with the Soviet Union as a check on possible Chinese political designs.

It is difficult to anticipate what the Burmese will do in the next five years.

In South Asia, India will primarily regard China as the power to watch. She will continue to invest heavily in defense expenditures[24] and will continue her nuclear program. To foil possible Chinese designs on India, India will maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States.

(*g*) In Africa, there will be primarily problems of political order and national integration. The trend towards authoritarian military regimes will become clearer. Apart from politics within the United Nations, where their votes will be much sought after, African states will generally have little impact on world politics.

4.2.3.2 *Scenario for 1985-2000*

It becomes so much more difficult to project the balance-of-power model beyond 1985. However, provided one remembers the same caveat noted earlier, the following projections may be considered:

(*a*) World politics will still remain balance-of-power politics, but there will be a clearer delineation of power clusters. One power cluster will be the United States, Canada and Latin America. Another will be the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. A third will be China with possibly Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (which will be reunified by 1985). A fourth power cluster will probably be Japan and the insular Southeast Asian countries. There may be a fifth which will comprise both Western European and Scandinavian countries. India may also constitute another power center if she could resolve her religious and linguistic differences with Pakistan. Another possibility is a mini-cluster of power, such as the present ASEAN members constituted into a more clearly political entity. Alternative power clusters may also develop in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Australia (with New Zealand).

The main point about this projection is that it envisages world politics no longer primarily in the strict sense of nation-state politics. The nation-state will continue to be present but its political activities will increasingly be expressed in the context of a regional structure. The region with its more logical definition of economic and/or cultural homogeneity will progressively displace the nation-state as the primary political unit.

(*b*) At least within the power-cluster, there will probably be evolved regional institutions to process and decide political and economic differences among member nation-states. The moderate success even of present international functional organizations, specially the primarily nonpolitical ones like the International Postal Union and the Communications Satellite Corporation, will encourage similar regional organizations. It may be possible later on for powerful (in the sense of being able to make binding decisions for the region or power cluster) organizations to increasingly be involved in economic and even political concerns. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the ASEAN may be the prototype of such politically and economically competent structures.

(*c*) Inter-regional or inter-cluster differences will be handled

through the mediation efforts of a third-party region or power cluster acceptable to the parties directly involved in an economic or political issue. There may have to be statesmen with the diplomatic skills of a Kissinger to effect settlement of such issues.

(*d*) The previous projections may appear to be extremely rational, logical developments and, therefore, in practice quite unlikely. There are signs, however, that such rational developments may be generated by the operation of several factors in world politics.

One, given the various power-clusters we speculate on in subsection (*a*) of section 4.2.3.2, it can be seen that there will be strong pressures for regions and power clusters to consider the economic importance of each group to the others. The Chinese-led cluster, for instance, appears to have a complementary economy with just about all power-clusters. For clusters that are potentially competitive, as in the case of the United States and Japan, comparative-advantage economics may lead to specialization in certain products. (Cheaper Japanese labor even now accounts for Japanese supremacy in transistor and other electronic industries.)

Two, political developments between 1985 and 2000 will also possibly result in minimizing tension among power clusters probably hostile to each other in the previous period 1975-85. By 1985, there will be a new Chinese leadership, which may not be as revolutionary as Mao's group. Perhaps in return for Soviet willingness to yield Indo-China to Chinese influence, China will be less belligerent in pressing for Chinese territory now incorporated into the U.S.S.R.

Three, the military developments which can be anticipated for the years 1985 to 2000 will make it probable that the major powers will have nuclear capabilities with more assured second-strike capabilities. As in the 1975 to 1985 period, such development will have a stabilizing effect on world politics.

Between 1985 and 2000, most if not all of the potential nuclear countries will have joined the nuclear club, but will discover the cost of maintaining such a capability (essentially minimal and possibly even negligible) prohibitive. Furthermore, in the face of greater regional integration or power-cluster identification (where the power center rather than the individual members provides for a nuclear umbrella), the appeal of costly national nuclear forces will have diminished.

(There is a possibility, however, that even while nuclear budgets diminish, expenses for nonnuclear military hardware would continue unabated. This sustained nonnuclear military build-up will represent an atavistic trend clearly set in the cold war politics of the 1950-70 period. Before 2000, however, such trend will be definitely broken as both "intra-regional, intra-cluster" and "inter-regional, inter-cluster" structures for settling differences become more and more influential.)

The fourth factor is a psychological one. There will be enough political leaders and statesmen who will devote their energies to a more universalized presentation of crises in population, resources and general ecology. The influence of such men will gradually seep down to the general population. Though the year 2000 may not see mankind indeed making a turn from narrow, partisan perceptions of interest, it will probably allow for enough people to consciously influence mankind towards a world community before the 21st century is over.

(e) There will be a further atrophy of U.N. political functions as world politics becomes inter-regional in character and as inter-regional and intra-regional, non-U.N. agencies more effectively cope with political issues.

Regional politics within the framework of the U.N. will not flourish. Power centers will refuse to be governed by popular voting, where regions with the greatest number of nation-states wield decisive pluralities.

The other functional, primarily economic, social and cultural agencies of the U.N. will continue to be useful for international and inter-regional purposes. These functional agencies may well provide the core for inter- and intra-regional cooperation.

(f) Global military capabilities will not equate with the global network of alliances popularized by the early postwar period. Due to diminishing political tension and, paradoxically, due to increasingly global military capabilities of the major regions or power clusters, military alliances of the NATO and Warsaw Pact type will have to accommodate less-centralized command centers traditionally dominated by a superpower.

There will be no permanent international or global military peace-keeping forces by the year 2000.

(g) There will be available more sophisticated means of checking upon nuclear arms and material to the point where it will be impossible to deceive the stations monitoring and recording military nuclear matériel.

There will be more nuclear-free zones, possibly in Africa and Southeast Asia, established before the year 2000.

4.3 Alternative Scenarios

If standard scenarios present a problem in imaging future world politics, alternative scenarios compound the problem. There is little resource but the imagination in fashioning alternative scenarios. Historical trends are not very useful in the generation of such scenarios.

4.3.1 Alternative Scenarios, 1975-85

4.3.1.1 Dominant Chinese influence in Asia

As a result of American evacuation of Indo-China, a political vacuum develops in the area. China becomes the dominant political influence in Indo-China and ultimately Asia when the major powers take the following courses:

a) The Soviet Union permits the regimes peripheral to China to identify with the latter. The Soviets do this hoping that such a gesture will convince Peking they are not irrevocably hostile to Chinese superpower ambitions. Also, the Soviets hope that the move will keep Peking from pressing claims upon Russian-occupied former Chinese territories.

b) The United States allows the growth of Chinese power in mainland Asia. Besides a military incapability in thwarting Chinese influence in the area, the United States feels confident that American naval power in the Pacific can keep China from expanding into island Southeast Asia and Japan.

c) Japan refuses to build up militarily, conceding that such an act would antagonize China and jeopardize a promising market in that country. Besides, Japan feels secure against a potential Chinese threat for as long as the American naval fleet and its nuclear umbrella persist.

Chinese domination of the mainland, together with the permissive attitudes of the three powers, will pressure other countries in the area to reach political accommodation with the Chinese regime. Overseas Chinese residents in Southeast Asian countries will probably also take their cue and manifest greater support for the mainland regime.

India will definitely step up her military build-up even as she tries to convince the major powers to guarantee her territorial integrity.

4.3.1.2 *Soviet development of a global naval capability*

Traditionally, naval power after World War II meant American naval power. There are indications that the Soviets have managed in the past decade to develop a navy with global capabilities.

In the next ten years, the naval power of the Soviets may be one of the factors that will vitiate Soviet-American détente. The United States had considered her supremacy in the oceans as a guarantor of national security for over a generation. Unless Soviet-American détente in other areas build up enough American trust in the Soviets, Soviet-American relations may degenerate to one of mutual suspicion as in the predétente days.

4.3.2 *Alternative Scenarios for 1985 to 2000*

4.3.2.1 *American adoption of an isolationist policy*

The United States closes practically all her military installations overseas and sends her troops back to continental United States. She pulls out of NATO and only marginally participates in U.N. programs. The main reason for such withdrawal is a generally shared feeling that the United States has played its role of peace keeper of the world for much too long, at extremely great expense, and with little gratitude from free world countries in return.

The Soviets will probably benefit most from the American policy. They will probe once more into Western Europe, causing countries in that area to either persuade the United States to drop isolationism, or they might rush into political unity to confront a common threat.

4.3.2.2 *Japanese political and military resurgence*

The Japanese decide to build a military commensurate to superpower status. It ignores constitutional provisions barring the state from developing a navy, an air force, and an army comparable in quality and number at least to the Soviet's. Japan develops a nuclear capability by 1985 comparable in sophistication, if not in numbers of missiles and size of warheads, with the Soviet's.

Japan is forced to take this measure presumably because of American withdrawal from active global politics (see previous scenario). Japan is left without any security beyond that guaranteed by a small self-defense force.

China is immediately alarmed and pursues an active campaign to recall Japanese imperialism and militarism in the last war. Asian countries, sharing the same fears of China, prevail either upon the United States or the Soviet Union to guarantee regional security against the perceived Japanese threat.

Once Japan has rearmed, however, neither the Soviet Union nor the United Sates can exert enough pressure to have Japan disarm. Should the United States then involve itself once more in Asian politics, the prevailing scenario will again be a balance-of-power, with four major states decisively affecting the balance.

5. World Political Scenarios: Policy Implications

5.1 *World Politics (1975-2000): A Summary*

The material in *World Political Scenarios* broadly sketches the political world as it probably will be in the next twenty-five years. The main image is that of balance-of-power politics largely influenced by four big powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. The model points out the increasing influence of other states in world political developments, particularly those with immediate regional repercussions. It will be less and less possible to dominate world politics from Washington or Moscow or both. There will be major Chinese and Japanese inputs, but more significantly, world politics will increasingly reflect the participation of less powerful states, primarily through regional organizations. These groupings, initially economically inspired, will be increasingly viable political structures in the next twenty-five years. This period in world history may well witness democratization (i.e., greater political weights will be assigned to traditionally ignored political entities) in the formulation and implementation of global or regional policies.

Integrative rather than disruptive processes of world politics are also emphasized in the scenarios of balance-of-power politics.[25] In addition to the thermonuclear character of modern warfare which motivates political actors to be less irresponsible in their pursuit of political ambitions, and thus to effect a greater number of political compromises, there may also be noted the growing influence of ecological humanism. More and more people perceive the multiple and simultaneous crises of unplanned population growth, inefficient food production, energy shortage, ecological pollution and widespread poverty as a syndrome of concerns amenable only to joint

international action. Although the nation-state may subsist beyond the year 2000 as man's main political organization, there is evidence now that chauvinistic politics has lost some of its traditional appeal. Increasingly, national pride and national interest have yielded to more sensible formulations within regional or even global contexts. The Japanese commitment to nuclear abstinence is an exemplary case. Here is a deliberate decision to depreciate a factor making for national pride in the interest of general disarmament and world peace. In the Middle East, the various attempts to generate peace indicate greater political maturity, at least in the case of Egypt and Israel, by eschewing the adolescent rhetoric of uncompromising national pride. In fact, as states work with each other, perhaps originally along nonpolitical lines, they discover the efficacy of collective action, develop trust in each other, and in due time, learn to work even on primarily political concerns. Although formally still uncommitted to political organizations, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) appear to be moving in the direction of political collaboration.

5.2. *Policy Recommendations*

For Philippine policy-makers who daily confront the complexities of world politics, the standard scenarios imaged in the general paper probably automatically indicate certain implications for our foreign policy. Most of these implications are quite self-evident and need no exceptional analytical powers to draw out. Perhaps only a couple might require the professional skills of a political scientist to extract and clarify.

5.2.1 As a matter of general orientation, Philippine foreign policy must manifest a perception of world politics primarily as a process of international accommodation. From 1946 to about 1972, although our rhetoric emphasized the general brotherhood of man, international cooperation and world peace, our actual policies supported the American thesis of world politics as a struggle between good and evil, as a crusade against corrupting ideologies. Philippine foreign policy since 1972 has sensibly minimized the dissonance between our international professions and actions. The more mature conception of world politics as international accommodation, as collective bargaining among states in most cases, must be a cornerstone of our foreign policy. This conception permits a more open type of diplomacy, a less paranoid perception of international relations. Lately, it has been this conception which allowed the Philippines to

sufficiently depreciate ideology such that relations with socialist countries ceased to be immoral.

5.2.2 As a general policy, the Philippines should work towards the stabilization of balance-of-power politics, specially in Southeast Asia. No major political actor should be allowed hegemony in the area. The Philippines, together with other ASEAN states, may pursue a policy which makes it necessary for any of the major powers to intervene in case any power develops imperialistic ambitions in Southeast Asia. This policy can be given substance through multilateral security arrangements with *all* major powers. Another possibility is the neutralization of the entire area of Southeast Asia, with the four major powers guaranteeing the integrity of the resulting neutral zone. A modification of the idea may make it applicable only to the ASEAN states. Demilitarization of the area and the prohibition of all foreign military and quasi-military installation may have to be considered by Philippine policy-makers.

As a further safeguard against any major actor enforcing hegemony in South and Southeast Asia, the Philippines should be sympathetic to national and international policies which politically or economically strengthen other Asian countries such as India and Pakistan. A similar attitude may be indicated for Australia, a potential buffer to at least one Asian power.

5.2.3 Beyond Southeast Asia, the Philippines can help in the stabilization of balance-of-power politics by encouraging regional political and economic organizations. Particularly in Africa and Latin America, where effective power clusters can be developed through collective organizations, the Philippines must project this commitment to regional organization.

5.2.4 Together with policies designed to stabilize balance-of-power politics, the Philippines should fashion a strategy for the eventual replacement of this political structure. The time frame here certainly stretches beyond the year 2000, but provision must be made for displacing balance-of-power politics (which will probably more effectively prevent a general nuclear war from erupting in the next twenty-five years) with another political structure where world citizens, either individually, nationally, or simply functionally (e.g., as members of professional groups, as engineers, farmers, teachers, etc.) may politically participate in world affairs.

Philippine policy-makers may utilize the United Nations and other international agencies in its long-range strategies towards the world community. No dramatic policies are contemplated here. Painstakingly, extremely slowly at times, many political, economic, social

and military functions of national societies may be institutionalized at a transnational or supranational level. The Philippine policy must be one of support for proliferating functionalism.

5.2.5 Of greater urgency is a Philippine commitment to a policy identifying critical areas of concern which have ceased to be simply national concerns. The policy must either identify an existing international agency or help in the creation of an agency which can cope with global problems of overpopulation, food shortages, ecological pollution, and the like. Within these agencies, the Philippines must be an active member, giving its commensurate share of manpower and financial requirements.

5.2.6 Finally, at a rather basic level, Philippine policy-makers should generate and improve resources that will keep the country within the mainstream of world developments. Professional training institutes, strictly supervised and generously funded, may be set up to effectively train incoming career men of the foreign service. The same training institutes may offer regular briefings to be required of all career men, with an eye towards updating their familiarity with international affairs.

5.2.7 There must be more research institutes staffed by competent men, be they academicians or career foreign service men. Largely specialist in training, the research staff will monitor international developments and provide for a continuing analysis of current affairs. These men will also be available at any time to work as a team on any foreign policy concern.

It is probably not a good practice to have only one or two of these "think tanks." Such a practice may breed extreme elitism in the research unit encouraging a highly secretive, inward-looking type of scholarship. The output of a research institute, even at times when the sensitiveness of an international issue warrants some amount of secrecy, will benefit from being examined by other responsible and competent scholars. Thinking is seldom a process which suffers the more there are responsible minds given to it. Scholarship, too, except in cases clearly involving national security, serves policy-makers best when much of it is public.

6. Conclusion: The Need for Political Imaging

Several times in the course of this paper, the writer sought to impress the reader with the pitfalls of futurology. In global politics where so much is in flux, even a comprehensible image of the present is a difficult achievement. He is indeed an imprudent man who claims success in imaging the future of world politics. Yet, for

people who will not allow the future to creep in on them unsuspected, there is no alternative to the active exercise of a disciplined imagination. This paper is such an exercise. Whether it succeeds or not in capturing some essential image of the future is for the readers to judge. If fate is kind, as it was in the case of Ithiel de Sola Pool, the scenario material here will only be 90 per cent wrong three years from now.

NOTES

[1]In a survey identifying the professional fields of American futurologists, more than half of the subjects were political scientists. See Billy Rojas and H. Wentworth Eldredge, "Status Report: Sample Syllabi and Directory of Future Studies," in Alvin Toffler, ed., *Learning for Tomorrow: The Role of the Future in Education* (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 347.

[2]There was general perception of a need to ground Sino-American relations (or lack of it) on other than pure ideology; hence the idea of a "new look" in Sino-American relations. However, as late as 1969, leading scholars and policy-makers were able to attend a national convention on "The United States and China: The Next Decade," and hardly anyone anticipated an American policy of détente with China. See A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer, eds., *The United States and China: The Next Decade* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 191-235.

Even a highly sympathetic evaluator of social, political, economic and technological developments in China appears to have precluded the likelihood of Sino-American détente for the next thirty-four years, from 1967 to the year 2001. See Han Suyin, *China in the Year 2001* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967).

[3]Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967).

[4]John McHale, *The Future of the Future* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1969).

[5]One is tempted here to refer to Peter Drucker's concept of "reprivatization." Such a policy would mean "the tasks which flowed to government in the last century because the original private institution of society, the family, could not discharge them would be turned over to the new, non-governmental institutions that have sprung up and grown these last sixty to seventy years." He cites the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and the multinational corporations as examples. See Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our Changing Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 234, 239-40.

[6]For one of the more recent statements of this view, see Mihajlo Mesaronic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1974).

A more dramatic, methodologically more simplified, presentation of the global character of modern economic and demographic crises is the first report to the Club of Rome by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, *et al.*, *The Limits of Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1972).

[7]The humanist historian, John K. Fairbank, aptly remarked, "The only answer to the problem of nuclear warfare is to place a higher value on the brotherhood of man, to refrain from polemics against other nations and to try to get a combination of hardware and diplomacy that will deter war and encourage peace." *The United States and China: The Next Decade*, pp. 197-98.

[8]Zbigniew Brzezinski, a very influential political scientist, foresees this revolution in liberal representational theory. Technological, functional representation, according to

him, will "fundamentally alter" the legislative and executive structures too, indicating the general systematic implications of representational developments. Daniel Bell, ed., "Toward the Year 2000," Daedalus XCVI, 3 (Summer, 1967), p. 671.

[9]Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity,* pp. 240-41.

[10]Mesarovic and Pestel, *Mankind of the Turning Point,* p. viii.

[11]Victor Ferkiss, *The Future of Technological Civilization* (New York: George Braziller, 1974), pp. 206-9.

[12]Kahn and Wiener, *The Year 2000,* p. 6.

[13]Compared to nuclear weapons, the primary "advantages" of BC agents are their relative inexpensiveness, ease of infiltration into enemy territory, and specifiable degree of effectiveness (i.e., BC agents may be prepared simply to immobilize or to decimate an enemy). Also, BC agents make it possible for enemy resources like factories and other physical plants to remain intact, for the immediate use of the occupying power.

For literature on BC warfare and the historical development of BC agents, the following may be consulted:

Seymour M. Hersh, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969).

United Nations, *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1970).

[14]*Times Journal,* June 16, 1975, p. 2; September 4, 1975, p. 4.

[15]Peter F. Drucker, *Landmarks of Tomorrow: A Report on the New "Post-Modern" World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 257-58.

[16]The need in most societies to effect social changes before essentially Western technologies can function is referred to by some scholars as "secondary development." Richard Adams, an anthropologist, speaks of it in the following manner:

"Secondary development is the kind that is used or goes on when the country finds itself the recipient of a vast, complex, technological establishment. Under these circumstances, it does not invent this technology; the technology has already been invented. It cannot decide which of the alternative forms of technology it will take because it is offered very few forms. The problem is how to adapt the technology to these societies. The fact of the matter is that the technology is too complicated to be adapted to that society, the society has to adapt to the technology. Because of this, it is necessary first to develop social answers to these things. It is this I am calling secondary development. It is fundamentally different from primary development in that the social developments have to be made first before the technological devices can diffuse into society and effectively begin to function in a productive way."

See Richard Adams, "The Pattern of Development in Latin-America," in James Charlesworth, ed. *Latin America Tomorrow* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965), pp. 8-9.

[17]Historically, the United States started with a rather favored position, resulting from its great prestige as the leading Allied power in the war against Japan and Germany, its monopoly of nuclear weapons, and the fact that both physically and psychologically American society was largely insulated from the devastation of the war. Thus, in the first postwar decade, American containment of Soviet power was largely successful. The United States girded the U.S.S.R. and its allies with a wall of military and political pacts. During this same period, however, the U.S.S.R. succeeded in consolidating its political hegemony over Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the success of the Chinese communists in 1949 secured the Soviet eastern flank and permitted the Soviets to effectively turn their attention to Eastern and Western Europe. In the same period, the Soviet broke the atomic monopoly of the United States, a feat which the United Kingdom duplicated soon afterward with American help.

[18]Max Lerner, *The Age of Overkill: A Preface to World Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 11.

[19]The French *force de frappe* did provide for both land-based and submarine-based missile delivery system in the 1970's.

[20]Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The International System in the Next Half Century," in American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, *Towards the Year 2000,* p. 930.

[21]Kei Wakaigumi, "Japan's Role in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs,* LII (July, 1974), pp. 311-12, 322.

[22]William Lockwood, "Asian Triangle: China, India, Japan," *Foreign Affairs,* LII (July, 1974), p. 837.

[23]Kahn and Wiener, *The Year 2000,* p. 229.

[24]India now spends over $2 billion annually, or about four per cent of her GNP, on arms alone. See Lockwood, *"Asian Triangle,"* p. 836.

[25]The standard scenarios for world politics in the next twenty-five years manifest a basic value of this author. Human life is the central political concern, not political power. The latter has often been mistaken for politics' principal end and thus political history has often been misrepresented as a chronology of conflict, a history of man's aggressive or imperialistic propensities. The humanist core of politics so prominent in Greek political literature, and so conveniently ignored in the post-Machiavellian world, reasserted itself after the destructive implications of nuclear war became generally accepted.

It is ironic, but perhaps predictable, that after the technological problem of suicide for the species was solved, human societies started to pay more attention to the problems of sustaining and improving the quality of human life.

The balance-of-power politics discussed in the general paper is a transitional political structure, hopefully giving way to more fully democratized, not necessarily nationally-defined, human political organizations. A world political community, the cherished dream of many thinkers, however, is probably not forthcoming even in the next fifty years.